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OPINION  OF THE COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
Attorney Andrew Dwyer, lauded by New Jersey 
judges in separate judicial opinions, published on his law 
firm’s website those complimentary remarks.  One of the 
judges objected to this, and ultimately the New Jersey 
Supreme Court adopted an attorney-conduct guideline that 
bans advertising with quotations from judicial opinions unless 
the opinions appear in full.  Is the guideline an 
unconstitutional infringement on speech as applied to the 
advertisements of Mr. Dwyer and his firm?  We believe it is 
and thus reverse the contrary decision of the District Court.      
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In 2007, Dwyer1 launched a website, 
www.thedwyerlawfirm.com.  Its home page greeted potential 
clients with the following prominently displayed 
advertisement: 
“Are You Thinking Of Suing Your Employer?” 
“Mr. Dwyer is, I think, an exceptional lawyer, 
one of the most exceptional lawyers I’ve had 
the pleasure of appearing before me. He is 
                                              
1 The plaintiffs-appellants in this case—Andrew Dwyer and 
his law firm, The Dwyer Law Firm, L.L.C.—are referred to 
collectively and individually as “Dwyer.”   
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tenacious, professional in his presentation to the 
Court, a bit too exuberant at times, certainly 
passionate about his position, but no one can 
fault his zeal and his loyalty to his client, and no 
one can question his intellect . . . .” 
---Hon. Jose L. Fuentes, J.S.C. 
 
“The inescapable conclusion is . . . that 
plaintiffs achieved a spectacular result when the 
file was in the hands of Mr. Dwyer. . . . Mr. 
Dwyer was a fierce, if sometimes not 
disinterested advocate for his clients, and 
through an offensive and defensive motion 
practice and through other discovery methods 
molded the case to the point where it could be 
successfully resolved.” 
---Hon. William L. Wertheimer, J.S.C. 
 
The excerpts are from unpublished (though 
presumably public) judicial opinions concerning fee 
applications in employment discrimination cases brought 
under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination.  They 
were made in the context of the statute’s fee-shifting 
provisions, which require judges to assess the abilities and 
legal services of plaintiffs’ attorneys.   
 By letter to Dwyer in April 2008, Judge Wertheimer 
requested that his quoted comments be removed from the 
website.  The Judge explained that, although he did “not have 
reason to doubt the accuracy of the verbiage,” he “would not 
care for potential clients [of Dwyer] to believe that it is a 
blanket endorsement” of him.  Dwyer refused to take the 
excerpt down because he did not believe the language was 
false or misleading.  Subsequently, Judge Wertheimer’s letter 
and Dwyer’s response were forwarded to the New Jersey 
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Bar’s Committee on Attorney Advertising (the “Committee”), 
whose members are the defendants-appellees before us.   
In February 2009, after several meetings and after 
receiving submissions from Dwyer, the Committee published 
a Notice to the Bar soliciting comments on a proposed 
attorney advertising guideline (the “Proposed Guideline”).  It 
provided that “[a]n attorney or law firm may not include, on a 
website or other advertisement, a quotation from a judge or 
court opinion (oral or written) regarding the attorney’s 
abilities or legal services.”  Dwyer submitted a comment in 
which he argued that the Proposed Guideline was an 
unconstitutional ban on speech.  In addition, while the 
Proposed Guideline was pending, Dwyer added to the website 
a third excerpt from an unpublished opinion concerning a fee 
application in a suit under the New Jersey Conscientious 
Employee Protection Act: 
“Based upon my observations of [Dwyer] in 
court there’s no question in my mind that he is 
in the upper echelon of employment lawyers in 
this state. . . .” 
---Hon. Douglas H. Hurd, J.S.C. 
Three years later, in May 2012, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court approved an amended version of the Proposed 
Guideline, now called Guideline 3.  It differs from the 
Proposed Guideline in one respect: whereas the Proposed 
Guideline simply banned advertising with quotes from judges 
or judicial opinions, Guideline 3 bans those ads but allows 
attorneys to advertise with the full text of judicial opinions.  
In its final form, Guideline 3 provides: 
Attorney Advertisements: Use of Quotations or 
Excerpts From Judicial Opinions About the 
Legal Abilities of an Attorney  
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An attorney or law firm may not include, on a 
website or other advertisement, a quotation or 
excerpt from a court opinion (oral or written) 
about the attorney’s abilities or legal services.  
An attorney may, however, present the full text 
of opinions, including those that discuss the 
attorney’s legal abilities, on a website or other 
advertisement.  
 
The official comment to Guideline 3 demonstrates that it was 
promulgated to target Dwyer’s website specifically:  
 
This Guideline arises from the review by the 
Committee on Attorney Advertising of an 
attorney’s website that included two quotations 
from judges about the attorney’s legal abilities.  
The quotations were from unpublished opinions 
of the judges on fee applications and the judges’ 
names and titles were included in the 
advertisement. 
 
[Rule of Professional Conduct] 7.1(a) prohibits 
misleading statements.  When a judge discusses 
an attorney’s legal abilities in an opinion, such 
as in a fee-shifting or division-of-fee case, the 
judge is setting forth findings of fact and 
conclusions of law pertinent to the decision in 
the matter.  The judge is not personally 
endorsing the attorney or making a public 
statement about the attorney for advertising 
purposes.  In fact, judges are expressly 
prohibited from endorsing attorneys or 
providing testimonials regarding attorneys.  The 
Committee finds that such quotations or 
excerpts, when taken out of the context of the 
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judicial opinion and used by an attorney for the 
purpose of soliciting clients, are prohibited 
judicial endorsements or testimonials.  As such, 
these quotations or excerpts from a judicial 
opinion in attorney advertising are inherently 
misleading in violation of [Rule of Professional 
Conduct] 7.1(a). 
 
The day before Guideline 3 went into effect Dwyer 
filed this action in the District of New Jersey seeking 
injunctive and declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  He 
simultaneously moved for a temporary restraining order and 
preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of the 
Guideline.  See Dwyer v. Cappell, 951 F. Supp. 2d 670, 671 
n.1 (D.N.J. 2013).  The District Court denied the request for a 
temporary restraining order and set a full briefing schedule 
for the preliminary injunction motion.  See id.  The parties 
then filed cross-motions for summary judgment, which the 
District Court considered concurrently with the motion for a 
preliminary injunction.  Id. 
During discovery, Dwyer deposed Carol Johnston, the 
designated agent for the Committee.  Ms. Johnston testified 
that the excerpts on Dwyer’s website violated Guideline 3.  
She claimed that, even if the quotations include hyperlinks to 
the full text of the judicial opinions, they would still violate 
the Guideline.  She also testified that, although the Committee 
had no evidence demonstrating that the excerpts misled 
potential clients, based on “common sense” it had concluded 
that excerpts from judicial opinions regarding attorneys’ 
abilities are inherently misleading.  Aside from Judge 
Wertheimer, there have been no complaints about Mr. 
Dwyer’s website, and no one has claimed being misled by the 
judicial excerpts.   
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The District Court granted the Committee’s summary 
judgment motion, denied Dwyer’s motion for summary 
judgment, and denied as moot his motion for a preliminary 
injunction.  See id. at 675-76.  It explained that “[t]he core of 
the parties’ dispute is the legal issue of whether Guideline 3 is 
most appropriately characterized as a ‘restriction’ on speech, 
or whether it instead is a regulatory requirement of ‘additional 
disclosure.’”  Id. at 673.  The Court concluded that “because 
[Guideline 3] requires full disclosure of a judicial opinion,” it 
is “not a ban on speech but is instead a disclosure 
requirement.”  Id. at 674.  Moreover, it held that a judicial 
quotation’s potential to mislead is “self-evident” because, 
“[w]ithout the surrounding context of a full opinion, judicial 
quotations relating to an attorney’s abilities could easily be 
misconstrued as improper judicial endorsement of an 
attorney, thereby threatening the integrity of the judicial 
system.”  Id. at 674-75. 
The District Court applied the test for disclosure 
requirements set in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).  
Under that standard, it determined that the Guideline was 
“reasonably related to the [S]tate’s interest in preventing the 
deception of consumers” and was not “unduly burdensome.”   
Dwyer, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 675.  Thus it upheld the Guideline 
as constitutional.  Id.  In a footnote, the Court noted that, even 
if Guideline 3 were a restriction on speech subject to the more 
rigorous intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson Gas & 
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557, 
563-64 (1980)—under which the regulation must “‘directly 
advanc[e]’ a substantial governmental interest and be ‘n[o] 
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest,”  
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 
229, 249 (2010) (alterations in Milavetz) (quoting Central 
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566)—it would still be constitutional, see 
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Dwyer, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 675 n.6.  Dwyer appeals these 
decisions as applied to him and his firm.2 
II.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
“This court reviews [a] [d]istrict [c]ourt’s decision 
resolving cross-motions for summary judgment de novo.”  
Startzell v. City of Phila., 533 F.3d 183, 192 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(italics added).  “To that end, we are required to apply the 
same test the [D]istrict [C]ourt should have utilized initially.”  
Chambers ex rel. Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of 
Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 181 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  This test requires a court to “grant 
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a).  We thus review de novo the District Court’s holding 
that Guideline 3 does not violate Dwyer’s speech rights under 
the First Amendment of our Constitution.   
III.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Restrictions on Speech and Disclosure 
Requirements.  The First Amendment states that “Congress 
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,”  U.S. 
Const. amend I, and applies to the States through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Gitlow v. 
                                              
2 Though Dwyer’s complaint and his opening brief on appeal 
mention a facial challenge to Guideline 3 (something the 
District Court did not deal with), Dwyer clarified at oral 
argument before us that he relies on the as-applied challenge 
exclusively.   
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New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).  The parties agree that 
our case involves only commercial speech.  It is by now well 
settled that “commercial speech is entitled to the protection of 
the First Amendment, albeit to protection somewhat less 
extensive than that afforded noncommercial speech.”  
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 637 (internal quotation marks omitted); 
see also Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 
(2011).  Similarly, though there was once a time when 
attorney advertising could be proscribed without justification, 
it is now settled that such advertising is “a form of 
commercial speech, protected by the First Amendment, and 
. . . ‘may not be subjected to blanket suppression.’”  In re 
R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 199 (1982) (quoting Bates v. Arizona, 
433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977)).  “‘[T]he party seeking to uphold a 
restriction on commercial speech carries the burden of 
justifying it.’”  Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993) 
(quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 
71, n.20 (1983)). 
As the District Court noted, this case concerns two 
possible tracks of analysis, only one of which can apply: 
restrictions on speech and disclosure requirements.  See 
Dwyer, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 674.  The Committee maintains 
that Guideline 3 is a disclosure requirement targeting 
misleading advertising and hence subject only to Zauderer 
scrutiny.  Dwyer contends that Guideline 3 is a restriction on 
non-misleading speech that should instead be reviewed under 
Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny.   
There are material differences between “outright 
prohibitions[3]” on speech, where the State attempts to 
“prevent attorneys from conveying information to the public,” 
                                              
3 While “restrictions” on speech are typically perceived as a 
subset of speech  “prohibitions,” we (as do other courts) use 
the terms interchangeably.   
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and “disclosure requirements,”  which seek only to require 
them to “provide somewhat more information than they might 
otherwise be inclined to present.”  Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650.  
Recognizing these differences, the Supreme Court has created 
different frameworks once it is determined whether a 
regulation is a restriction or a disclosure requirement.   
For restrictions, there are three general categories of 
commercial speech: non-misleading, potentially misleading, 
and misleading.  The more misleading the advertisement, the 
more constitutional leeway is granted the States in restricting 
it.  In this context, “[c]ommercial speech that is not false, 
deceptive, or misleading” may only be restricted if the 
regulation withstands intermediate scrutiny under Central 
Hudson.  Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof. Reg., Bd. of 
Accountancy, 512 U.S. 136, 142 (1994).  States may prohibit 
potentially misleading ads, but only if the information cannot 
be presented in a way that is not deceptive (such as through 
adding a disclosure requirement).  R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203.  
Advertising that is inherently misleading or has proven to be 
misleading in practice “may be prohibited entirely.”  Id.; see 
also Ibanez, 512 U.S. at 142 (“[F]alse, deceptive, or 
misleading commercial speech may be banned.”).  To repeat 
in another way, restrictions on speech get protection under the 
Constitution inversely proportional to the deceptiveness of the 
target advertisement.    
As noted, disclosure requirements receive less rigorous 
scrutiny than restrictions on speech.  See Zauderer, 471 U.S. 
at 651; see also R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 
1205, 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (characterizing Zauderer 
scrutiny of disclosure requirements as “akin to rational-basis 
review”).  In the attorney advertising context, the Supreme 
Court has consistently preferred disclosure over prohibition.  
It recognized in Bates that, “because the public lacks 
sophistication concerning legal services,” advertising by 
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attorneys poses special risks of deception.  433 U.S. at 383.  
Because of this risk, “some limited supplementation, by way 
of warning or disclaimer[4] or the like, might be required,” 
even where an advertisement contains only truthful 
information about the availability and terms of legal services, 
“so as to assure that the consumer is not misled.”  Id. at 384; 
see also id. at 375 (“[T]he preferred remedy is more 
disclosure, rather than less.”).  Subsequently, in R.M.J. the 
Court noted that where an attorney advertisement is 
potentially misleading, “the remedy in the first instance is not 
necessarily a prohibition but preferably a requirement of 
disclaimers or explanation.”  455 U.S. at 203 (citing Bates, 
433 U.S. at 375).  Bates and R.M.J. demonstrate that, when it 
comes to attorney advertising, the State may compel 
supplemental disclosures to clarify truthful but potentially 
misleading advertisements.  However, in neither case did the 
Court set a standard for evaluating these disclosures.        
That void was filled by Zauderer.  There an attorney 
advertised to putative clients that “cases are handled on a 
contingent fee basis of the amount recovered.  If there is no 
recovery, no legal fees are owed by our clients.”  471 U.S. at 
631.  The advertisement failed to comply with a state 
disclosure requirement mandating that any advertisement for 
contingent fee representation warn that, while potential 
contingent-fee clients would not be responsible for legal fees, 
                                              
4 Though we typically think of a disclaimer as a “statement 
that one is not responsible for or involved with something,” 
Black’s Law Dictionary 562 (10th ed. 2014), and a disclosure 
as “a revelation of facts,” id., they may meld.  For example, to 
require that lawyers’ advertisements state that what a judge 
wrote “is not an endorsement” is both a disclaimer of an 
endorsement and a disclosure of supplemental information.  
Thus courts sometimes use the terms interchangeably.   
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they may still be responsible for court costs.  Id. at 633.  
Zauderer was subsequently brought up on disciplinary 
charges for, among other things, failing to include the 
disclosure.    
The Supreme Court rejected Zauderer’s argument that 
the state disclosure requirement violated his free speech 
rights.  Id. at 650-53.  It explained that where the State 
requires an advertiser to “include in his advertising purely 
factual and uncontroversial information about the terms under 
which his services will be available,” the “constitutionally 
protected interest in not providing any particular factual 
information in [the advertisement] is minimal.”  Id.  at 651 
(emphasis in original).  The Court was quick to note, 
however, that this did not mean “that disclosure requirements 
do not implicate the advertiser’s First Amendment rights at 
all.”  Id. at 651.  It therefore set out the now-prevailing 
standard for assessing their constitutional validity: disclosure 
requirements are permissible so long as they are “reasonably 
related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of 
consumers,” id., with the understanding that “unjustified or 
unduly burdensome disclosure requirements might offend the 
First Amendment by chilling protected commercial speech.”  
Id.  
Applying this new standard to Zauderer’s case, the 
Court held that the State’s requirement “easily pass[ed] 
muster . . . .”  Id. at 652.  Absent the disclosure, it was 
“hardly a speculative” assumption that a substantial number 
of laypersons not aware of the distinction between “fees” and 
“costs” would be left with the impression that a loss in court 
would be entirely free of charge.  Id.  Although the State 
produced no evidence that consumers were deceived, the 
Court explained that “[w]hen the possibility of deception is as 
self-evident as it is in this case, we need not require the State 
to conduct a survey of the . . . public before it [may] 
14 
 
determine that the [advertisement] had a tendency to 
mislead.”  Id. at 652-53 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted) (second and third alterations in original).  In this 
rule-of-reason context, the disclosure requirement did not 
abridge Zauderer’s freedom of speech. 
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the Zauderer 
framework for analyzing disclosure requirements in Milavetz, 
559 U.S. at 249-50.  There attorneys brought a First 
Amendment challenge to a requirement that professionals 
assisting consumers with bankruptcy must state in their ads 
that “[w]e are a debt relief agency.  We help people file for 
bankruptcy relief under the Bankruptcy Code.”  Id. at 233 
(quoting 11 U.S.C. § 528(a)(4)).  The attorneys contended 
that Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny should apply.  Id. 
at 249.  The Court rejected this argument and instead upheld 
the requirement under Zauderer.  Id. at 249-50.  It explained 
that Zauderer applied because the provision in question was 
“directed at misleading commercial speech” and “impose[d] a 
disclosure requirement rather than an affirmative limitation 
on speech.”  Id. at 249 (emphasis omitted).  The takeaway: 
there exist different frameworks for analyzing restrictions on 
speech and disclosure requirements.   
Guideline 3 bears characteristics of both categories.  
Yet we need not decide whether it is a restriction on speech or 
a disclosure requirement.  This is because the Guideline is not 
reasonably related to preventing consumer deception and is 
unduly burdensome.  Hence it is unconstitutional under even 
the less-stringent Zauderer standard of scrutiny.  
B.  Guideline 3 Cannot Survive Zauderer Scrutiny.  
The Committee hyperbolizes that the excerpts prohibited by 
Guideline 3 are inherently misleading because laypersons 
reading such quotes would understand them to be judicial 
endorsements.  Even were we to assume that excerpts of 
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judicial opinions are potentially misleading to some persons, 
the Committee fails to explain how Dwyer’s providing a 
complete judicial opinion somehow dispels this assumed 
threat of deception.5   
A disclosure requirement is “reasonably related to the 
State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers” where 
it could plausibly dispel the misleading nature of the 
advertisement to those who read it.  Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 
651.  In Zauderer the requirement succinctly highlighted the 
latent ambiguity in the advertisement by requiring a 
disclosure that, although consumers would not owe legal fees, 
they could still potentially owe court costs.  See 471 U.S. at 
652.  Similarly, in Milavetz the required disclosure clarified to 
consumers that an advertisement for bankruptcy “relief” was 
hiding the possibility that this relief could itself be costly.  
                                              
5  As to whether judicial opinion excerpts on Dwyer’s website 
actually have the potential to mislead, we note that the 
Committee has produced no evidence this is so, instead 
relying on “common sense.”  While it is the law that “[w]hen 
the possibility of deception is . . . self-evident” a state is not 
required to produce evidence to justify its imposition of a 
disclosure requirement, Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 251 (quoting 
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 652), “we cannot allow rote invocation 
of the words ‘potentially misleading’ to supplant the . . . 
burden to demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and 
that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material 
degree,” Ibanez, 512 U.S. at 146 (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted).  Unlike the advertisements targeted by 
the disclosure requirements in Zauderer and Milavetz, which 
had the obvious propensity to deceive laypersons, the 
deceptiveness of accurately transcribed statements made by 
judges in judicial opinion excerpts is far from “self-evident.”   
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See 559 U.S. at 251-52.  In each case there was a reasonable 
argument that the disclosure remedied the potentially 
misleading advertisement.     
In contrast, Guideline 3 does not require disclosing 
anything that could reasonably remedy conceivable consumer 
deception stemming from Dwyer’s advertisement.  Providing 
a full judicial opinion does not reveal to a potential client that 
an excerpt of the same opinion is not an endorsement.  
Indeed, providing the full opinion may add only greater 
confusion.  A reasonable attempt at a disclosure requirement 
might mandate a statement such as “This is an excerpt of a 
judicial opinion from a specific legal dispute.  It is not an 
endorsement of my abilities.”  Such a statement or its 
analogue would, we believe, likely suffice under Zauderer.  
Guideline 3 does not.   
Even more supportive of Dwyer’s position is that 
Guideline 3 is unduly burdensome.  The Supreme Court 
recognized in Zauderer that “unduly burdensome disclosure 
requirements might offend the First Amendment by chilling 
protected commercial speech.”  471 U.S. at 651.  While the 
Court did not explain in what circumstances a disclosure 
requirement could be “unduly burdensome,” it later clarified 
that this condition exists where the required disclosure is so 
lengthy that it “effectively rules out” advertising by the 
desired means.  See Ibanez, 512 U.S. at 146.   
Ibanez thus becomes instructive.  There a Florida 
attorney who was also a certified financial planner (“CFP”) 
listed her CFP credential next to her name in advertisements 
in the yellow pages, on her business card, and on her law 
office stationery.  Id. at 138.  In a subsequent disciplinary 
proceeding the State Board of Accountants argued that, if 
Ibanez wanted to list herself as a CFP, Florida law required 
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that she would have to provide a disclosure.  It required, “in 
the immediate proximity” of the CFP designation,  Ibanez to  
[1] state that the recognizing agency [here the 
Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards] 
is not affiliated with or sanctioned by the state 
or federal government . . . [and] [2] set out the 
recognizing agency’s requirements for 
recognition, including, but not limited to, 
education, experience, and testing.   
Id. at 146 (citations, brackets, and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The Supreme Court rejected the requirement as 
unduly burdensome because “[t]he detail required . . . 
effectively rule[d] out notation of the [CFP] designation on a 
business card or letterhead, or in a yellow pages listing.”  Id. 
at 146-47.6    
Post-Ibanez the Fifth Circuit Court similarly struck 
down an attorney disclosure requirement as unduly 
burdensome.  See Public Citizen Inc. v. La. Att’y Disciplinary 
Bd., 632 F.3d 212, 228-29 (5th Cir. 2011).  The case involved 
a Louisiana requirement that attorneys disclose substantial 
information in any televised advertisement:   
[A]n attorney [television] advertisement must 
include, both written in a large font and spoken 
slowly, at least all of the following information: 
(1) the lawyer’s name and office location; (2) a 
client’s responsibility for costs; (3) all 
jurisdictions in which the lawyer is licensed; (4) 
the use of simulated scenes or pictures or actors 
portraying clients; and (5) the use of a 
                                              
6 The Court also found the requirement unjustified because 
the alleged harm was “purely hypothetical.”  Id. at 146.   
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spokesperson, whether the spokesperson is a 
lawyer, and whether the spokesperson is paid. 
Id. at 229 (internal citations omitted and emphasis in 
original).  This requirement, the Court held, “effectively 
rule[d] out” attorneys’ abilities “to employ short 
advertisements of any kind” and was therefore overly 
burdensome.  Id.; see also Tillman v. Miller, 133 F.3d 1402, 
1403-04 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam); cf. Borgner v. Brooks, 
284 F.3d 1204, 1215 (11th Cir. 2002) (upholding one 
sentence disclosure as not “especially long or burdensome”).      
Guideline 3 effectively rules out the possibility that 
Dwyer can advertise with even an accurately quoted excerpt 
of a judicial statement about his abilities.  To comply with 
Guideline 3, he must advertise with a full-length judicial 
opinion if he wants to use any portion of that opinion on the 
website.  Even a hyperlink to unquoted portions of the 
opinion fails the Guideline.  This requirement is far more 
onerous than the disclosures invalidated in Ibanez and Public 
Citizen and necessarily prevents any form of advertisement 
with simply a judicial excerpt.  The only realistic medium for 
quoting a full judicial opinion in an advertisement is, 
ironically, a website, with its theoretically endless capacity.   
However, even on Dwyer’s own website providing a full-text 
judicial opinion is so cumbersome that it effectively nullifies 
the advertisement.7   
While the intention behind Guideline 3 may be to 
make it so burdensome to quote judicial opinions that 
attorneys will cease doing so, that type of restriction—an 
                                              
7 While we recognize that Dwyer challenges Guideline 3 only 
as applied to his website, the effect of the Guideline is all the 
more stark, when applied to attorney advertising in a 
newspaper or magazine, let alone on the radio or television.   
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outright ban on advertising with judicial excerpts—would 
properly be analyzed under the heightened Central Hudson 
standard of scrutiny.  Although such a ban would fail as 
applied to Dwyer given our holding under the less stringent 
Zauderer standard, we need not decide whether such a ban 
would be valid in other cases.  Because Guideline 3 
effectively precludes advertising with accurate excerpts from 
judicial opinions on Dwyer’s website, it is unduly 
burdensome. 
*   *   *   *   * 
 Guideline 3 as applied to Dwyer’s accurate quotes 
from judicial opinions thus violates his First Amendment 
right to advertise his commercial services.  Requiring Dwyer 
to reprint in full on his firm’s website the opinions noted 
above is not reasonably related to preventing consumer 
deception.  To the extent the excerpts of these opinions could 
possibly mislead the public, that potential deception is not 
clarified by Guideline 3.  In any event, what is required by the 
Guideline overly burdens Dwyer’s right to advertise.  We 
thus reverse the order of the District Court and remand the 
case. 
